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Abstract
Individuals who are more sensitive to punishment from error are more likely to pro-
vide nonresponses in surveys. We argue Neurotics’ sensitivity to punishment leads them
to avoid gathering costly information and forming/reporting opinions about stimuli. Us-
ing data from the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we show Neuroticism is
strongly and positively associated with NA/DK responses when placing politicians on a 7-
point ideological scale. We then introduce to political science a Bayesian hierarchical model
that allows nonresponse to be generated by both a lack of information as well as disincentives
for response. Using this model, we show that the NA/DK responses in these data are likely
due to inhibited information collection—as opposed to indecision from error avoidance—by
Neurotics.
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1 Introduction
Individuals may fail to respond to political questions for many reasons. One reason may be the
influence of an individuals’ personality traits.1 Personality traits are persistent individual differ-
ences, and personality psychologists have developed trait structures to capture underlying struc-
ture in those that have been identified. The five factor model of personality traits has achieved a
high degree of support frompsychologists, and political scientists have been incorporating the Big
Five personality traits identified by this model into the study of political behavior and institutions
(Dietrich et al. 2012, Gerber et al. 2010, Gerber et al. 2011a, Mondak &Halperin 2008, Mondak
et al. 2010). Neuroticism is associated with instability and variability, suggesting it is of partic-
ular importance for information processing (Flehmig et al. 2007, Mondak et al. 2010, Robin-
son & Tamir 2005), and it has been associated with lower levels of political knowledge (Gerber
et al. 2011b). However, there are a number of mechanisms by which it may express itself through
nonresponse on items requiring political knowledge—namely, inhibited data collection and in-
decisiveness from lower expected utilities of response. Neurotics may inhibit their exposure to
contentious political information, or they may be less likely to form opinions due to “mental
noise” or, as we argue, error sensitivity (Gerber et al. 2011b, Mondak & Halperin 2008, Robin-
son & Tamir 2005). However, little work has been done to understand how Neuroticism leads
individuals to be less likely to respond to political questions, a question we investigate here.2
However, doing so requires statistical methods that model the underlying nonresponse deci-
sion, as both psychological processes (inhibition and indecision) result in observationally equiv-
alent NA/DK responses, but treating such responses identically has the potential to affect infer-
ences due to underlying group-level heterogeneity. This is endemic to survey research, as many
1Evidence suggests personality traits are stable and causally prior to attitudes and behaviors, which draws us to
these particular variables even though we acknowledge that there are many other psychological variables that may
be important (Fraley & Roberts 2005, McCrae 1994, McCrae & Costa 1996, Roberts & DelVecchio 2000).
2One notable exception is the work of Jessee (2015) and Ramey, Klingler & Hollibaugh (2015a), who argued
personality traits are unrelated to why individuals choose “don’t know” responses on surveys.
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surveys give individuals the opportunity to skip questions (NA) or elicit “don’t know” (DK) re-
sponses. Though traditional practice often involves deleting these observations, doing so can lead
to biased inferences. Fortunately, Bradlow & Zaslavsky (1999) provide an approach that mod-
els missingness using a hierarchical, multiple latent variable approach. It considers individuals’
responses to ordinal indicators as a product of three variables: saliency, opinion, and decisiveness.
Remarkably, this approach mirrors our model of decisionmaking as a function of Neuroti-
cism. We expand on this approach and marry it with the insights of the Aldrich & McKelvey
(1977) approach tomodeling ideological placements of elites by voters. This hybrid model allows
us to use surveys with missing data to estimate the ideological placements of elites in a common
space, and to examine the underlying psychological processes that result in NA/DK responses,
which would not be possible with more conventional methods of dealing with missingness.3
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We first discuss the literature on missingness and
multiple imputation. We then discuss the five factor model of personality, focusing on Neu-
roticism, and review existing literature on its connection with political information. We then
expand upon the core cognitive constraint framework proposed by Ramey, Klingler & Hol-
libaugh (2015b), and articulate two mechanisms—inhibition and indecision—for this trait that
this framework implies.4 We then introduce and discuss our new Bayesian hierarchical model.
Subsequently, we investigate the relationship between Neuroticism and NA/DK responses. We
predict NA/DK responses as a function of both the ability of individuals to collect adequate
information to form an opinion on an item (salience) as well as their sensitivity to potential
error disutility from reporting clear opinions (decisiveness). The results suggest that NA/DK
responses are primarily a feature of Neuroticism’s inhibited information gathering as opposed
to indecisiveness from error sensitivity. We then discuss the implications of our results for the
study of political information as well as the characterization of personality traits for modeling
3Even modifications of the Aldrich-McKelvey method that allow for missing data (e.g.,Hare et al. 2014) assume
the missingness is random, which we argue is an untenable assumption.
4For an alternative perspective, see Hall (2015).
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purposes.
2 Missing Data
Missing data have long drawn the ire of social science researchers. In the case of surveys, item non-
response can cause serious problems formultivariate analysis. Moreover, traditional remedies like
listwise deletion, pairwise deletion, mean-insertion, or dummy variable adjustment have been
shown to cause serious bias in estimates and/or inferences (King et al. 2001, Allison 2009). As a
result, a large literature (e.g., Berinsky 1999, Brehm 1993, Gelman, King & Liu 1998, Heckman
1976, King et al. 2001, Rubin 1976, Rubin 1977, Rubin 1987) has emerged to model missingness
in ways that minimize the inference bias traditional remedies might induce.
This literature can be divided into two loosely-defined classes. The first is that of multiple
imputation models (e.g., Gelman, King & Liu 1998, Rubin 1976, Rubin 1977, Rubin 1987). This
paradigm seeks to “impute” the missing values by using other observed information in the data.
The method has become popular, as it is easy to implement and available in most standard statis-
tical packages. Though some difficulty may arise when variables are nominal or ordinal, as is the
case in surveys, imputation is about as close as one can get to a one-size-fits-all methodology.
However, this approach has limitations, two of which are of particular interest here. First, the
missingness must obey the so-called missing at random assumption. Following King et al. (2001),
data satisfy MAR if missingness can be modeled as a function of observed data. However, if the
missing observations cannot be predicted from observed covariates, MAR is not satisfied and
multiple imputation is no longer an option (Weisberg 2009). A second issue is that individuals
who do not choose a response or elicit “don’t know” may be actually making a choice in the
same sense as the other categories given to them. If this is true, King and his co-authors concede
that cases “. . .when ‘no opinion’ means that the respondent really has no opinion rather than
prefers not to share information with the interviewer, should be treated seriously and modeled
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directly...” (King et al. 2001, p. 59).
The other class is deemed by King et al. (2001) as “application specific” (e.g., Bartels 1999,
Berinsky 1999, Brehm 1993, Heckman 1976, Jessee 2015), and generally requires modeling of the
missingness mechanism, which can be difficult and varies across applications. For example, two
such approaches (Berinsky 1999, Heckman 1976) consider data in terms of the selection model,
where those choosing NA/DK select themselves out of the sample. This approach yields useful
results, but it has limitations; these models require exclusion restrictions to ensure identification,
and they restrict missingness to result from only one choice. However, it is also plausible to think
missingness results from several different factors, including insufficient information to form and
report opinions, disincentives for response, or indifference due to uncertainty.
Relatedly, there is a rich literature on uncertainty and candidate evaluation that is generally
more concerned with examination of uncertainty manifesting itself as response variance than
nonresponse (e.g. Alvarez 1999, Alvarez & Brehm 2002, Alvarez & Franklin 1994, Glasgow &
Alvarez 2000, Zaller & Feldman 1992). However, Bartels (1986) considers nonresponse to be a
result of uncertainty, and Alvarez & Franklin (1994) note that “it is natural to treat these ‘don’t
know’ respondents as more uncertain than those who place the [stimulus], but then say they
are not very certain of the location” (680). Since missingness may result from uncertainty, we
find it plausible that it may arise from either insufficient information to form and report an
opinion, from low expected utilities of response among those who have opinions, or both.5 We
believe that focusing on personality traits—in particular, Neuroticism—and modeling the deci-
sionmaking process can help us understand and uncover the different reasons why respondents
elicit NA/DK responses.6
5We assume individuals are sensitive to error, such that uninformative beliefs and subsequent guessing might
lead nonresponse to be optimal (Holroyd & Coles 2002). Furthermore, among individuals who have uncertain but
informative beliefs, the expected utility of response would be a function of the penalties (or rewards) for ‘incorrect’
(or ’correct’) responses and the probability of providing such a response. The probability of incorrect responses
would presumably increase with belief variance.
6While Jessee (2015) examines the relationship between personality and “don’t know” responses, he does not
explicitly model the decisionmaking process that leads to such responses, instead preferring to rely on a multinomial
4
3 Neuroticism, Inhibition, and Indecision
The Big Five model of personality proposes five personality traits derived from factor analysis
of personality questionnaires as well as descriptive language (Goldberg 1981, John 1990), and
this five-trait structure—Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neu-
roticism (often reverse-coded as Emotional Stability)—has achieved prominence (Block 1995,
Eysenck 1992, John, Naumann& Soto 2008). These traits have been used to predict life outcomes
ranging from romantic fulfillment to mortality, with predictive power comparable to socioeco-
nomic status and cognitive ability (Roberts et al. 2007). Neuroticism in particular is associated
with anxiety, depression, impulsiveness and vulnerability to stress (Almlund et al. 2011). Related
traits include external locus of control, high irritability and a sense of vulnerability to external
conditions (John, Robins & Pervin 2008). Neurotics tend to have low self-esteem and are unsta-
ble, withdrawn, easily angered, and difficult to motivate.
There are few clear connections between Neuroticism and political phenomena, though one
that has received attention is an association with ideological extremism (Soldz & Vaillant 1999).
A second line of inquiry stems from the idea that Neurotics may have more uncertainty about
the attitudes they do have (Mondak et al. 2010).Others have examined the relationship between
Neuroticism and political information. Mondak & Halperin (2008) hypothesized Neurotics’
instability would lead them to be more opinionated (in contrast with emotionally stable individ-
uals who would remain calm and silent) and found that Neurotics have less political knowledge,
and lower levels of opinionation, but not necessarily less political interest. Gerber et al. (2011b)
posited political contentiousness would prevent Neurotics from becoming interested and knowl-
edgeable about politics, a contention supported by the data. However, we have not yet been
able to distinguish between insufficient political knowledge about political stimuli (measured
via nonresponse) arising from either inhibited information collection or from refusal to reveal
probit item response model. However, this approach, while useful, is inapplicable when the decisionmaking process
is hierarchical and NA/DK responses may arise from different processes, which is what we argue here.
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opinions, through Neuroticism has been connected to both mechanisms. We spend the rest of
this section articulating howNeuroticism’s neurological roots should lead individuals to perceive
greater penalties for error (and thus be more likely to refuse to form and reveal a clear opinion)
and less likely to collect information.
The association betweenNeuroticism and error sensitivity has been linked to serotonin in the
brain (Gray&McNaughton 2003), with a broader theory arguing that Neuroticism is a biochem-
ically induced fixation on punishment (DeYoung & Gray 2009, Gray & McNaughton 2003). In
the lab, Neurotics are prone to behavioral inhibition through passive avoidance and freezing, pre-
sumably due to this fixation on punishment (DeYoung &Gray 2009). If Neurotics are fixated on
error and punishment, absent some shock, the best way to avoid punishment and stress would
be to withdraw and maintain the status quo. Whether through sensitivity to error, stress avoid-
ance, or a tendency to negative self-evaluation, Neuroticism can be modeled as a sensitivity to and
fixation on prospective punishment, as proposed by Ramey, Klingler & Hollibaugh (2015b).
Punishment in this context refers to losses relative to a neutral reference point, and mod-
eling utility in such a manner is similar to the approach taken by prospect theory (Depue &
Collins 1999,Derryberry&Reed 1994,Kahneman&Tversky 1979, Tversky&Kahneman 1992).
Fortunately, the process by which individuals choose to form an opinion and report such an
opinion in a survey is a decision-theoretic one, meaning that we can consider the decision by an
individual to form a clear opinion on the ideological position of a political actor. In line with the
relative utility structure suggested by the neuropsychology literature onNeuroticism, we assume
there is a status quo baseline with zero utility. It is trivial to state that any losses in comparison
with the status quo are thus negative utilities, and any gains are accordingly positive utilities.
We assume individuals, when presented with a stimulus, must choose between forming and
reporting a clear opinion, or not forming and reporting an opinion. In the present context, we
use the term formation to refer to both the decision to form an opinion and report that opinion
for public evaluation. If no opinion is formed, the status quo is maintained and the individual
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receives neither punishment nor reward. If an opinion is formed, the individual forms the correct
one with probability p ∈ (0,1) and receives a reward, R, or the incorrect one with probability
1− p and receives a punishment L. We assume the punishment is a negative emotional state
which arises from experiencing error, and the reward consists of the positive feelings from being
correct, as well as any other gains that may result from having accurate information.
Suppose there is a two dimensional type space for the sensitivity to reward and punishment.
We assume the sensitivity of an individual to punishment is x ∈ [1,∞) and the sensitivity to
reward is y ∈ [1,∞). Thus, the punishment, L, is weighted by x, and the reward, R, is weighted
by y. As a result, we have the following utilities for opinion formation and non-formation:
UN = 0
UF = pRy − (1− p)Lx.
We define m to be R
L
, or the ratio of the magnitude of the reward to the magnitude of the
punishment. If we identify the conditions under which it is optimal to not form an opinion, and
substitute in m appropriately, we see non-formation is weakly optimal when
x ≥

p
1− p

my. (1)
Thus, as the importance of punishment increases, non-formation is more likely to be optimal.
Now, consider an extension where the player may pay a cost c ∈ [0,ω (Ry + Lx)] to collect
additional information and increase the probability of a correct opinion from p to p+ω, where
ω ∈ (0,1− p].7,8 The costs of information acquisition aside, the utility of non-formation is unaf-
fected by p, while the utility of formation increases. However, we assume individuals will look
at the potential benefit of paying the cost and will only do so if it weakly increases their expected
7For tractability, assume both c andω are exogenously determined. However, the substantive results are similar
if the individual is allowed to pay varying costs c for varying amounts of information.
8The upper bound on c ensures the cost is sufficiently reasonable relative toω.
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utility. Therefore, the ability to pay for information acquisition results in three cases. In the first
case, where x <

p
1−p

my, then opinion formation is always optimal, and the individual is suffi-
ciently insensitive to punishment that there is no need to pay for more information before doing
so. However, since doing so increases the probability of being correct, and therefore increases
the potential rewards relative to the potential punishments, the individual will pay the cost. In
the second case, where x ∈

p
1−p

my,

p+ω
1−p−ω

my − c
L(1−p−ω)

, then opinion formation is opti-
mal, conditional on the individual paying for more information before doing so, as he or she is
sufficiently sensitive to punishment (but not so much that opinion formation is never optimal).
Finally, in the third case, where x >max
¦
p
1−p

my,

p+ω
1−p−ω

my − c
L(1−p−ω)
©
, then opinion for-
mation is never optimal, because the individual is so sensitive to punishment that not even the
additional information that could be purchased will be sufficient (at least at the specified cost).
Additionally, since there are limits to the information that may be gathered, increasing x, ceteris
paribus, will weakly increase the probability no opinion is formed and gathering no information
becomes more optimal. Figure 1 presents an example of how shifts in the relative sensitivities to
reward and punishment affect the opinion formation and information acquisition decisions.9
We assume personality measures for the trait of Neuroticism capture its core cognitive con-
straint, which is a sensitivity to prospective punishment. Accordingly, Neuroticism is associated
with sensitivity to punishment, parameterized as x in the above model. In the empirical model
we present below, the utility of response relative to nonresponse is described as decisiveness.10
As increases in x are associated with an increased likelihood of choosing not to form an opinion,
we obtain the following hypothesis for Neuroticism:
Hypothesis 1 More Neurotic individuals should be less be decisive.
Next, collecting information on a particular stimulus can be described as finding that stimulus
9Figure 1 was created using R= 3, L= 3, p = 0.5, ω = 0.2, x ∈ [1,10], y ∈ [1,10], and c = 1.
10This terminology used by Bradlow & Zaslavsky (1999) in the discussion of the hierarchical model used here.
This terminology is limited to thismodel and not the broader concept of decisiveness in the public opinion literature.
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Figure 1: Opinion Formation as a Function of Sensitivities to Reward and Punishment
to be salient. In the decision described above, as x increases, it is more likely it will be suboptimal
for an individual to collect information on a stimulus. This generates a second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 More Neurotic individuals should find the response stimuli less salient.
As Neurotic individuals collect less information and are less likely to choose to form and
report opinions, we expect them to be more likely to not have clear evaluations of stimuli and
therefore present NA/DK responses, suggesting the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 More Neurotic individuals should provide more NA/DK responses.
Finally, as Neurotics will collect less information, they will be less informed about broad sets
of stimuli, including the ideological scale itself, thus generating our final hypothesis:
9
Hypothesis 4 More Neurotic individuals should incorrectly perceive the ideological scale.
4 A Statistical Model of the Decisionmaking Process
The most common approach to modeling ideological placements of elites by voters was pio-
neered by Aldrich & McKelvey (1977). The Aldrich-McKelvey algorithm assumes an arbitrary
individual i ’s placement of an elite stimulus j on an ordinal ideological scale is given by
yi j = ai + bi x j + ǫi j , (2)
where ai and bi are individual distortion parameters and x j are the latent ideological locations of
the elite stimuli.11 The distortion parameters capture the idea that individuals may perceive the
underlying ideological space in different ways. Aldrich & McKelvey (1977) estimate this model
using a Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) and demonstrate it accurately recovers the locations
of the stimuli and the levels of information possessed by the survey respondents.
Unfortunately, this procedure cannot handle missing values and removes individuals who
fail to place even just one stimulus. Addressing this shortcoming, Hare et al. (2014) develop a
Bayesian version that can incorporate missing values.12 Their approach assumes missing place-
ments are missing at random and are drawn from the assumed distribution of the placements.
However, this assumption is problematic in general and in particular with respect to Neu-
roticism. Specifically, we do not believe missing placements are missing at random. Instead, we
believe missing placements are influenced by individuals’ personality traits—namely, their vary-
ing degrees of Neuroticism. If this is the case, then we should actively model the decisionmaking
process whereby individuals decide to answer (or not to answer) elite placement questions.
Our approach does just this. We expand upon a model developed in the marketing literature
11This formulation is simplified from the original paper, but is equivalent with appropriate substitutions.
12However, it still requires a minimum number of stimuli are scaled by a given respondent.
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by Bradlow & Zaslavsky (1999), which assumes NA/DK responses are driven by latent psycho-
logical processes. We takes this approach and marry it with the core insights of the Aldrich-
McKelvey algorithm. While our specific interests are in the effects of Neuroticism, the general
framework we develop can be applied to any similar decisionmaking setup.
4.1 The Model
Let i = 1,2, . . . ,N denote the set of respondents to a survey and let j = 1,2, . . . , J denote the a set
of stimuli that they are asked to rate on an ordinal scale. For each individual i , yi j is his ordinal
response to item j . Typically, these sorts of items involve five- or seven-point scales. If i skipped
the item, his response is coded as either NA or DK. In most analyses of these data, ordered probit
or logit are employed, with the probabilities of the various yi j s modeled as functions of covariates
X and cutpoints cq . Estimation is either achieved by maximizing a likelihood function or, with
assignment of priors, a sampling from posterior distributions.
This can be interpreted as a generalization of the ordered probit, with the main departure
being the multiple latent variables. In the ordered probit, the yi j s are viewed as realizations of an
underlying y∗i j , where the ordinal values are determined by cutpoints on the latent scale. The hi-
erarchical approach views an individual’s response as a product of three latent processes: saliency,
opinion, and decisiveness. Saliency, given by ψi j , is the first latent factor in the decision-maker’s
process. If the item is not salient, ψi j < 0 and the respondent will elicit a NA/DK response.
If the item is salient, the next stage involves computing i ′ s opinion about the location of j ,ϑi j .
Since placing stimuli at extremes of the scale might be systematically different from placing them
at the center, respondents whose latent opinion is more extreme are assumed to have definitive
opinions. The extremity is defined in terms of cutpoints, cq , where q = 1, . . . ,Q − 1 represents
the ordinal response category, c0 =−∞ and cQ =∞. An opinion ϑi j is considered extreme if
ϑi j 6∈ [cL, cH ] (3)
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Figure 2: The Hierarchical Model
Salient
ψi j ≥ 0
Not Salient
ψi j < 0
NA/DK Response
yi j =NA/DK
Saliency
ψi j
Extreme Opinion
ϑi j 6∈ [cL, cH ]
Ordinal Response
yi j = q
Moderate Opinion
ϑi j ∈ [cL, cH ]
Opinion
ϑi j
Not Decisive
δi j < 0
NA/DK Response
yi j =NA/DK
Decisive
δi j ≥ 0
Ordinal Response
yi j = q
Decisiveness
δi j
where the cutpoints cL and cH depend on the number of possible ordinal responses given on
the particular item. In particular, it is assumed that cL = cqL−1 and cH = cqH . qH and qL are
typically chosen so that they straddle the cutpoint that corresponds to the center-most category.
For example, if the observed data is from a seven-point scale, category 4 is at the center. This
makes qL = 3 and qH = 5 ideal candidates for cL = c2 and cH = c5 respectively.
13
13Depending on the data, researchers may desire to modify the indifference region bounds accordingly.
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Should i have a ϑi j that satisfies the above condition, we assume that he will elicit an ordinal
response and not NA/DK. However, if ϑi j ∈ [cL, cH ], we say that i is in the region of indifference.
This, in turn, leads to the last stage in the decision tree. We can imagine that a latent opinion
in this range might lead to one of two observed behaviors. If the individual is decisive, then he
would be more inclined to elicit an ordinal response than if he were indecisive. This notion is
formalized in the third latent variable δi j , where δi j ≥ 0 implies i ’s decisiveness on the item and
hence, an ordinal response will be given. If he is not decisive, δi j < 0 and the NA/DK response
is given. The entire process is depicted in Figure 2.
This model provides a rich description of behavior. For example, the NA/DK response can
be observed if the respondent has a high expected value of nonresponse (indecisiveness) or if
the respondent lacks adequate information with which to form an opinion (salience). These are
different kinds of NAs and are modeled as such. Additionally, if there are no NAs, this model
reduces to a simple ordered probit; this model is therefore always preferred, as it picks up effects
that the ordered probit would miss, but still produces the same results when NAs are absent.
4.2 Hierarchy I: Distribution of y |φ1,φ2
It is assumed the three latent variables, ψi j , ϑi j , and δi j are distributed normally with variance
1. Saliency, ψi j , is assumed have a mean µ
ψ
i j
such that
µψ
i j
= ηi +X
ψ
i j
βψ, (4)
where ηi is a random intercept allowing individuals to vary in terms of saliency andX
ψ
i j
is a vector
of person-item covariates thought to influence saliency. This captures the idea that when certain
properties of the stimuli match certain properties of the respondent, the itemmight then bemore
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(or less) salient. For the latent opinion ϑi j , the mean is given by
µϑi j = αi + γiξ j , (5)
where ξ j is the true latent position of stimulus j and (αi ,γi ) are individual-specific distortion
parameters. This approach deviates from the original Bradlow & Zaslavsky (1999) model, but
is in keeping with the literature in political science that uses the Aldrich & McKelvey (1977)
technique (e.g., Hare et al. 2014, Hollibaugh, Rothenberg & Rulison 2013). Importantly, unlike
the Aldrich-McKelvey approach, we treat ordinal responses as ordinal (and not continuous).
The final latent variable, decisiveness δi j has a mean
µδi j = Z
δ
i β
δ , (6)
and Zδi is a vector of covariates affecting decisiveness. These covariates are not indexed by j , as
decisiveness is assumed to be a property of the individual and not the items.
These latent draws may be summarized as follows:
ψi j ∼N

µψ
i j
, 1

(7)
ϑi j ∼N

µϑi j , 1

(8)
δi j ∼N

µδi j , 1

. (9)
The complete data likelihood is found based on the above definitions of the latent variables.
The likelihood function is given by
L(φ1,φ2|yi j ,X ,Z)∝
N∏
i=1
J∏
j=1
pi j (φ1,φ2|yi j ,X ), (10)
where the pi j are probabilities associated with the ordinal outcomes. For simplicity, Figure 3
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Figure 3: The Hierarchical Model with Probabilities
Salient
Pr

ψi j ≥ 0

= 1− r
Not Salient
Pr

ψi j < 0

= r
NA/DK Response
Pr

yi j =NA/DK & ψi j < 0

= r
Saliency
ψi j
Extreme Opinion
Pr

ϑi j 6∈ [cL, cH ]

= 1− s
Ordinal Response
Pr

yi j = q 6∈ [cL, cH ]

= (1− r )(1− s)
Moderate Opinion
Pr

ϑi j ∈ [cL, cH ]

= s
Opinion
ϑi j
Not Decisive
Pr

δi j < 0

= 1− t
NA/DK Response
Pr

yi j =NA/DK & ψi j ≥ 0

= s(1− r )(1− t )
Decisive
Pr

δi j ≥ 0

= t
Ordinal Response
Pr

yi j = q ∈ [cL, cH ]

= (1− r )s t
Decisiveness
δi j
presents a simplified decision tree broken down into three different probabilities: r , s , and t . To
evaluate pi j in these terms, we need to look at the various responses that could be provided on
the ordinal items. First, we consider the case where i elicits NA/DK. This could have resulted
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two ways, as is seen in Figure 3. Thus, the probability of observing a NA/DK response is
Pr

yi j =NA/DK

= r + s(1− r )(1− t )
= Φ

−µψ
i j

+

Φ

cqH −µ
ϑ
i j

−Φ

cqL −µ
ϑ
i j

1−Φ

−µψ
i j

Φ

−µδi j

. (11)
Second, we look at non-NA responses that fall outside of the indifference region. The prob-
ability of observing a response outside of this region is given by
Pr

yi j = q /∈ [qL,qH ]

= (1− r )(1− s)
=

1−Φ

−µψ
i j

Φ

cq −µ
ϑ
i j

−Φ

cq−1−µ
ϑ
i j

. (12)
Finally, there is the probability of observing a non-NA response that is within the indifference
region. Examining Figure 3, this is given by
Pr

yi j = q ∈ [qL,qH ]

= (1− r )s t
=

1−Φ

−µψ
i j

Φ

cq −µ
ϑ
i j

−Φ

cq−1−µ
ϑ
i j

1−Φ

−µδi j

. (13)
Note that in Equation 12, Φ

cq −µ
ϑ
i j

−Φ

cq−1−µ
ϑ
i j

is denoted as 1− s , whereas in Equa-
tion 13 it is defined as s . This is due to s representing an arbitrary choice inside the indifference
region, whereas Φ

cq −µ
ϑ
i j

−Φ

cq−1−µ
ϑ
i j

represents a particular choice q that is assumed to
be either outside (Equation 12) or inside (Equation 13) the indifference region. That in mind, we
can assemble the pieces indicated in Equations 11 through 13 into a single statement as follows:
pi j

yi j

=


Φ

−µψ
i j

+

Φ

cqH −µ
ϑ
i j

−Φ

cqL −µ
ϑ
i j

1−Φ

−µψ
i j

Φ

−µδi j

, if yi j =NA/DK
1−Φ

−µψ
i j

Φ

cq −µ
ϑ
i j

−Φ

cq−1−µ
ϑ
i j

, if yi j = q /∈ [qL,qH ]
1−Φ

−µψ
i j

Φ

cq −µ
ϑ
i j

−Φ

cq−1−µ
ϑ
i j

1−Φ

−µδi j

, if yi j = q ∈ [qL,qH ] .
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4.3 Hierarchy II: Distribution of φ1|φ2
The second layer of hierarchy looks at the vector of prior parameters φ1 = (η,α,γ ,ξ ). Each of
these is normally distributed as follows:
ηi ∼ N (Z
η
i
βη,σ2η) (14)
αi ∼ N (Z
α
i β
α,σ2α) (15)
γi ∼ N (Z
γ
i
βγ ,σ2γ ) (16)
ξ j ∼ N (0,1). (17)
The Zm , for m ∈φ1, are matrices of covariates assumed to influence saliency and the scale usage
parameters. For identification, we place standard Normal priors on the stimuli. In the following
application, we assume the matrices of covariates are the same across parameters (i.e., Zm = Z).
4.4 Hierarchy III: Distribution of φ2
The final layer is the vector of hyperparameters for the coefficients, variances, and cutpoints:
φ2 = (β
ψ,βδ ,βη,βα,βγ ,σ2η ,σ
2
α,σ
2
γ , c).
Each group of coefficients for each latent parameter m are drawn from aMultivariate Normal
distribution with mean 0 and covariance Σ:
βm ∼MVN (0,Σ) (18)
The choice of Σ can be as large or as small as necessary.14 For the variance of the saliency
intercept and the distortion vectors, we employ an uninformative conjugate prior defined on
14Here, the diagonal elements of Σ are chosen to be 25.
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R
++. Standard results show this distribution to be the Inverse Gamma. Thus, the prior for σ2m ,
σ2m ∼ IG

ρ
2
,
1
2

, (19)
and ρ is chosen to be 1
2
.
Last is the vector of cutpoints. All cutpoints are assumed to be drawn uniformly from the
last cutpoint to the current cutpoint. More specifically,
cq |cq−1, cq+1 ∼U

cq−1, cq+1

,q = 1,2, . . . ,Q − 1, (20)
c0 =−∞, cQ =∞, and, for identification, some q
′ ∈ {1,2, . . . ,Q − 1}, cq ′ =−1.5.
4.5 The Full Posterior
We combine the expressions for the likelihood and priors to form the complete posterior:
π(φ1,φ2|y,X )∝L(y|φ1,φ2,X )p(φ1|φ2, y,X )p(φ2). (21)
As is the case with all hierarchical models, there is a large number of parameters to estimate;
we are required to estimate a minimum of 3N + J +Q − 3 parameters (not including the βs or
σ2s). Fortunately, Bayesian methods are well-suited for these sorts of models. We use Plummer’s
(2003) JAGS software to sample from the full posterior. The model converges relatively quickly,
with the results relatively consistent after approximately 5,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler.
5 Predicting Nonresponse with Personality
To examine the relationships between Neuroticism and responses to ideological placement ques-
tions aswell as the underlying decisionmaking process, we rely on data from the 2014Cooperative
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Congressional Election Study (CCES). Within this survey, we asked 1,000 respondents to place
themselves and nine political figures on a seven-point ideological scale. These figures include
President Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, Jeb Bush, Rand Paul, Ted Cruz, the Democratic and
Republican Parties, the Tea Party, and the SupremeCourt. We also asked each respondent to take
the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (“TIPI”) as a way of estimating their Big Five traits on a 1–7
scale, which we then normalized to a 0–1 scale (Gosling, Rentfrow & Swann 2003). While the
TIPI is shorter than standard instruments, it is well-suited to tasks like the CCES, where time is
limited, and results from the TIPI tend to be highly correlated with the results onewould get from
longer and larger batteries of questions (Ehrhart et al. 2009, Gosling, Rentfrow & Swann 2003).
We first estimate a series of binomial probit models where the dependent variable is the num-
ber of NA/DK responses elicited when respondents were asked about the nine figures. In addi-
tion to the Big Five, we include as independent variables respondents’ age, gender, income, and
education, indicator variables for whether they identified as Black, Hispanic, or some other race,
a variable (High News Interest) that equals one if the respondent indicated that he or she “fol-
low[s] what’s going on in government and public affairs” most of the time and zero otherwise,
and an additional variable (Unknown News Interest) that equals one if the respondent indicated
he or she did not know how often they followed current events, and zero otherwise, as these con-
cepts have been shown to be important determinants of ideological uncertainty (e.g., Alvarez &
Franklin 1994, Bartels 1986, Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996, Jackson 1993). Results are in Table 1.
Across all models, Neuroticism is positively associated with higher proportions of NA/DK
responses. Figure 4 illustrates how the predicted proportion of NA/DK responses increases as
Neuroticism increases.15 As can be seen, the predicted proportion ofNA/DK responses increases
from about 0.318 (when Neuroticism is set to two standard deviations below its mean) to about
0.435 (when Neuroticism is set to two standard deviations above its mean).
15In Figure 4, the estimates from Model 5 from Table 1 were used, as it had the lowest BIC of those models
estimated. All continuous [categorical] variables were set to their means [modes].
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Table 1: Binomial Regression Models of the Number of NA/DK Responses
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Neuroticism 0.845∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.095) (0.098) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103)
Conscientiousness −0.295∗∗∗ −0.293∗∗∗ −0.069 0.060 0.069 0.032
(0.096) (0.102) (0.106) (0.113) (0.113) (0.114)
Agreeableness 0.591∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.115) (0.119) (0.125) (0.126) (0.127)
Extraversion 0.049 0.106 0.075 0.201∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.082) (0.086) (0.089) (0.091) (0.092)
Openness −0.505∗∗∗ −0.636∗∗∗ −0.356∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗ −0.314∗∗∗ −0.318∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.105) (0.110) (0.114) (0.115) (0.117)
Female 0.496∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
Age −0.015∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.014∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Age2/100 0.000 0.003 0.015∗∗ 0.009 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Black 0.072 0.073 −0.061 −0.118∗ −0.127∗
(0.060) (0.062) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066)
Hispanic 0.362∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.149∗∗
(0.064) (0.066) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069)
Other Race 0.130∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗ 0.158∗∗
(0.070) (0.071) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077)
Education (1 =No HS; 6 = Postgrad) −0.252∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
High News Interest −0.800∗∗∗ −0.791∗∗∗ −0.800∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049)
Unknown News Interest 1.053∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.101) (0.103)
Income (1 = <10k; 12 = >150k; 13 = Refused) −0.052∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Income Refused 0.360∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.089)
Employed Full-Time −0.022
(0.053)
Employed Part-Time −0.215∗∗∗
(0.070)
Unemployed 0.076
(0.082)
Retired 0.123
(0.078)
Constant −1.051∗∗∗ −0.411∗∗ 0.512∗∗ 0.181 0.284 0.231
(0.123) (0.201) (0.210) (0.220) (0.222) (0.227)
AIC 4778.624 4318.770 3962.678 3519.371 3474.323 3463.090
Log Likelihood −2383.312 −2147.385 −1968.339 −1744.685 −1720.161 −1710.545
Num. obs. 817 817 817 817 817 817
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
We next utilize Aldrich-McKelvey estimation to recover the underlying ideological space.
Though this method does not allow one to include NA/DK responses, one benefit is that it
provides estimates of respondents’ political information, based on the correlation of the “true”
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Figure 4: Predicted Results from Tables 1 and 2.
ideological space with how they perceive it.16 Higher values indicate respondents’ perceptions of
the ideological world correlate highly with reality. Table 2 presents the results of a series of Tobit
models where the dependent variable is the respondents’ estimated level of political information
and the independent variables are those used in Table 1.17
Across all models, higher levels of Neuroticism are correlated with lower correlations be-
tween the “true” ideological space and respondents’ perceptions. Figure 4 illustrates how the
predicted correlation decreases as Neuroticism increases.18 As can be seen, the predicted correla-
16Hare et al.’s (2014) Bayesian version of the Aldrich-McKelvey algorithm allows for missing values, but relies on
the MAR assumption. Additionally, Poole’s (1998) “Black Box” method allows one to include NA/DK responses,
and the recovered placements are substantively identical to those recovered from the Aldrich-McKelvey method.
17A Tobit model is used because the dependent variable lies in the [−1,1] interval by construction; substantively
identical results are found if a zero-one inflated beta regression model—with the dependent variable rescaled to lie
within the [0, 1] interval—is used. Though the (rescaled) beta model is arguably more appropriate due to the Tobit’s
censoring assumptions, the Tobit model results are presented, due to better interpretability.
18In the Tobit results in Figure 4, the estimates from Model 7 from Table 2 were used, as it had the lowest BIC of
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Table 2: Tobit Models of Correlation of Perceived Ideological Space with True Ideological Space
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Neuroticism −0.202∗∗∗ −0.189∗∗ −0.156∗∗ −0.144∗ −0.140∗ −0.149∗∗
(0.075) (0.077) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075)
Conscientiousness 0.174∗∗ 0.155∗ 0.116 0.127 0.127 0.145∗
(0.083) (0.085) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
Agreeableness −0.019 −0.006 0.041 0.038 0.037 0.042
(0.085) (0.089) (0.088) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087)
Extraversion −0.103 −0.103 −0.089 −0.098 −0.105∗ −0.111∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Openness 0.154∗ 0.154∗ 0.079 0.059 0.062 0.045
(0.083) (0.083) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083)
Female −0.030 −0.020 −0.006 −0.003 −0.003
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Age −0.005 −0.004 −0.005 −0.006 −0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age2/100 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.010∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Black −0.092∗ −0.093∗ −0.080 −0.071 −0.066
(0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050)
Hispanic −0.058 −0.052 −0.037 −0.030 −0.024
(0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Other Race 0.008 0.006 −0.001 0.004 0.001
(0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Education (1 =No HS; 6 = Postgrad) 0.057∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
High News Interest 0.092∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Unknown News Interest 0.062 0.049 0.037
(0.140) (0.140) (0.140)
Income (1 = <10k; 12 = >150k; 13 = Refused) 0.006 0.008
(0.005) (0.005)
Income Refused 0.016 0.008
(0.057) (0.058)
Employed Full-Time 0.015
(0.041)
Employed Part-Time 0.008
(0.054)
Unemployed 0.136∗
(0.072)
Retired −0.041
(0.053)
Constant 0.662∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.169)
Ln(scale) −0.946∗∗∗ −0.953∗∗∗ −0.976∗∗∗ −0.982∗∗∗ −0.984∗∗∗ −0.988∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
AIC 707.541 710.092 678.200 673.979 675.268 677.963
Log Likelihood −346.770 −342.046 −325.100 −320.989 −319.634 −316.981
Num obs. 722 722 722 722 722 722
Cens. Obs. 6 6 6 6 6 6
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
all models estimated. All continuous [categorical] variables were set to their means [modes].
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tion of the perceived space with the true space decreases from about 0.856 (when Neuroticism is
set to two standard deviations below its mean) to about 0.677 (when set to two above its mean).
However, the results thus far do not allow us to analyze the underlying decisionmaking pro-
cess, nor do they allow us to distinguish between different kinds of NA/DK responses. Thus, we
shift our focus to the hierarchical model outlined earlier.19 For this model, the regressors included
in the Opinion Intercept regression are all independent variables contained in Models 6 and 12
from Tables 1 and 2. These same variables are used in the Opinion Slope, Saliency Intercept, and
Decisiveness regressions. To estimate the stimuli-dependent slopes in the Saliency regression, we
create an indicator variable that equals 1 if the stimulus is of the same party as the respondent,
and 0 otherwise (Copartisan).20 Finally, on the seven-point scale, we set 3 (“Somewhat Liberal”)
and 5 (“Somewhat Conservative”) to be the bounds of the indifference region.
Table 3 presents the means of the estimated posterior distributions, and Figure 5 presents
the estimated posterior distributions for the ideologies of the stimuli, as well as point estimates
from the Aldrich-McKelvey estimation.21,22 To identify the scale for the hierarchical model, the
ideologies of President Obama and Senator Ted Cruz are fixed at -1 and 1, respectively. All pos-
terior distributions are tight, and correlate highly
 
R2 ≈ 0.9896

with those recovered from the
Aldrich-McKelvey estimation, suggesting that the hierarchical model effectively taps into the
same dimension as the Aldrich-McKelvey method, with the advantage of being able to provide
information about the latent decisionmaking process, a feature we will exploit later.
Table 3 indicate Neuroticism has a negative relationship with the slope in the Opinion equa-
19For our analyses below, we ran the model for 70,000 draws each for four chains (with an additional tuning pe-
riod of 10,000 draws per chain), burned the first 20,000 draws per chain, and applied a thinning interval of 10 to the
remaining draws to reduce autocorrelation, thus leaving us with 5,000 draws per chain from the posterior distribu-
tion. As we show in the online Appendix, the standard Gelman-Rubin (1992) diagnostic suggests convergence was
achieved for all parameters. Results are substantively identical if the original (unthinned) chains are used.
20The Democratic Party, Barack Obama, and Hillary Clinton were coded as Democratic. The Republican Party,
the Tea Party, the Supreme Court, Ted Cruz, Jeb Bush, and Rand Paul were coded as Republican.
21For presentational purposes, the Aldrich-McKelvey estimates are linearly rescaled to ensure that the estimates of
President Obama and Ted Cruz are−1 and 1, respectively. This rescaling has zero effect on the reported correlation.
22Model diagnostics are in the supplementary Appendix.
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Figure 5: Comparison of Estimated Ideology of Stimuli using the Aldrich-McKelvey Method
Versus the Hierarchical Model. Points for the hierarchical model indicate median estimates, and
the violin plots indicate the posterior distributions; placements of Obama and Cruz are fixed at
-1 and 1 respectively to identify the scale.
tion, which is illustrated in Figure 6; indeed, over 98% of the posterior distribution lies to the
left of zero. This suggests Neuroticism is associated with ideological placement being less highly
correlated with the underlying ideological space, a result consistent with those from the Aldrich-
McKelvey models, and in further support of Hypothesis 4.
One draw of the hierarchical model is its ability tomodel the decisionmaking process and pin-
point why Neurotic individuals are more likely to provide NA/DKs. In the Saliency intercept
equation in Table 3, the coefficient on Neuroticism is negative, and the 80% HPD interval does
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Figure 6: Posterior Distributions of Estimated Effects of Traits on Opinion Slopes, Saliency
Intercepts, and Decisiveness. Points indicate medians. Bars indicate middle 80% of distributions.
not contain zero.23 These results suggest Neurotic individuals are less likely to find the stimuli
salient, increasing the probability of NA/DKs, in support of Hypothesis 2. Additionally, politi-
cal interest is associated with higher saliency intercepts, suggesting those who aremore politically
interested are more likely to find the stimuli salient and therefore less likely to provide NA/DKs.
Turning to the Decisiveness equation, we find less support for our relevant hypothesis (Hy-
pothesis 1), further illustrated in Figure 6. Indeed, the estimate for the coefficient on Neuroti-
cism is close to zero, and the 5%HPD interval for this coefficient is the largest one that does not
contain zero, providing strong evidence against Hypothesis 1’s prediction of Neuroticism being
negatively associated with decisiveness. Moreover, 43% of the posterior distribution lies to the
left of zero, and 57% lies to the right, indicating near-symmetric uncertainty about zero. Indeed,
these results suggest the larger proportion of NA/DK responses (in support of Hypothesis 3) is
due to inhibition—as opposed to indecision—on the part of Neurotics.
23Over 93% of the posterior distribution for this estimate lies to the left of zero.
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Table 3: Hierarchical Model Results
Opinion Opinion Saliency Saliency
Intercept Slope Intercept Slope Decisiveness
(βα) (βγ ) (βη)
 
βψ
  
βδ

Neuroticism 0.756∗∗ −0.677∗∗ −0.830† 0.111
(0.301) (0.319) (0.568) (0.610)
Conscientiousness −0.297 0.869∗∗ 0.396 −1.258†
(0.340) (0.355) (0.650) (0.863)
Agreeableness 0.523† 0.425 −1.147† 0.926
(0.353) (0.372) (0.724) (0.816)
Extraversion −0.629∗∗ −0.253 0.134 −1.298∗∗
(0.258) (0.270) (0.530) (0.569)
Openness 1.574∗∗∗ 0.142 −0.008 1.398∗
(0.339) (0.353) (0.661) (0.715)
Female −0.081 −0.074 −0.771∗∗∗ −0.647∗∗
(0.127) (0.133) (0.259) (0.323)
Age −0.019 −0.032 0.078∗ −0.067†
(0.022) (0.023) (0.042) (0.051)
Age2/100 0.018 0.041† −0.052 0.077†
(0.023) (0.024) (0.043) (0.053)
Black 1.038∗∗∗ −0.486∗∗ −0.437 2.800∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.212) (0.372) (1.050)
Hispanic 0.344† −0.262 −0.814∗∗ 2.560∗∗
(0.246) (0.256) (0.411) (1.215)
Other Race −0.335† 0.012 −0.728∗ 1.240
(0.233) (0.242) (0.423) (1.142)
Education (1 =No HS; 6 = Postgrad) 0.135∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗
(0.044) (0.047) (0.095) (0.119)
High News Interest −0.086 0.687∗∗∗ 1.623∗∗∗ 1.222∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.139) (0.278) (0.337)
Unknown News Interest −0.350 −0.805† −2.675∗∗∗ 0.856
(0.497) (0.515) (0.575) (1.303)
Income (1 = <10k; 12 = >150k; 13 = Refused) −0.027 0.014 0.083∗ 0.024
(0.023) (0.024) (0.049) (0.063)
Income Refused 0.002 0.304 −0.120 −0.931†
(0.239) (0.249) (0.544) (0.610)
Employed Full-Time 0.000 0.054 −0.116 0.150
(0.170) (0.179) (0.333) (0.355)
Employed Part-Time −0.439∗∗ 0.048 0.395 −0.078
(0.217) (0.230) (0.426) (0.432)
Unemployed −0.035 0.744∗∗ −0.431 0.530
(0.295) (0.312) (0.478) (1.010)
Retired −0.110 −0.146 −0.288 0.099
(0.220) (0.231) (0.457) (0.488)
Copartisan 0.503∗∗∗
(0.149)
Constant 0.970† 1.530∗∗ −0.872 1.996†
(0.657) (0.692) (1.097) (1.290)
c2 −0.091
∗∗
(0.045)
c3 1.174
∗∗∗
(0.067)
c4 2.467
∗∗∗
(0.078)
c5 3.472
∗∗∗
(0.086)
c6 5.179
∗∗∗
(0.098)
Num. Obs. 817
Note: Posterior means reported. Posterior standard deviations in parentheses.
Stars indicate the relevant HPD interval does not contain zero: ∗∗∗99%, ∗∗95%, ∗90%, †80%
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Overall, our analysis suggests more Neurotic individuals are more likely to provide NA/DK
responses to ideological placement questions on political surveys, are less likely to accurately
perceive the underlying ideological space, and that this is at least in part due to these questions
being less salient to these individuals. We have also uncovered evidence that this response pat-
tern is not due to more Neurotic individuals being less decisive, in contrast to our expectations.
Nonetheless, these results support our conception of Neuroticism as being a proxy for sensitiv-
ity to punishment. Moreover, they suggest the mechanism is one of inhibition as opposed to
indecisiveness. Finally, the hierarchical model is able to go further than traditional methods of
addressing NA/DK responses and look at the factors influencing saliency and decisiveness across
individuals; the significant coefficients in all equations are prima facie evidence that more conven-
tional methods might result in incorrect inferences, suggesting that this model will help scholars
to better understand the processes that lead to NA/DK responses in survey data.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper introduces to political science a Bayesian hierarchical model for ordinal data that al-
lows for NA/DK responses to be driven by latent psychological processes. While our interests
here are in the effects of Neuroticism, this framework can be applied to any similar setup, thus
allowing scholars to better model decisionmaking processes and generate more reliable estimates
of effects. Importantly, the ideological estimates produced by this model are nearly identical
to those produced to the Aldrich-McKelvey model, suggesting that that both tap into the same
ideological dimension. However, the ability of the hierarchical model to provide us informa-
tion about the underlying decisionmaking process gives it an advantage beyond the traditional
Aldrich-McKelvey method (and ordered probit). That said, it should be noted that the original
Bradlow & Zaslavsky (1999) model was designed for consumer satisfaction surveys, and is there-
fore an imperfect fit to the data used here; arguably, the middle categories in satisfaction surveys
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more clearly represent “indifference” than those on ideological scales. However, that we generate
nearly identical estimates of perceived ideology across both methods suggests this is not a major
problem and that the model works appropriately with empirical data. Nonetheless, we plan in
the future to leverage this model and apply it to the study of political approval. Furthermore, the
empirical and theoretical models may be adapted to situations in which penalties may be derived
from social indesirability rather than inaccuracy of opinion.
Substantively, we have found evidence Neuroticism is associated with higher rates of NA/DK
responses on surveys and an inability to correctly place political figures on an ideological scale.
Additionally, we have argued that these higher rates of NA/DKs are in part due to reduced
salience formoreNeurotic individuals as opposed to higher rates of indecisiveness. More broadly,
these results are consistent with a theory of opinion formation (and reporting) and information
acquisition based on a model of Neuroticism as representing a core cognitive constraint of sensi-
tivity to punishment. The effect of Neuroticism on salience compared to decisiveness is consis-
tent with our theory that more Neurotic individuals, looking down the game tree in everyday
contexts, identify contexts in which they will choose to be indecisive, and select to avoid collect-
ing costly information in anticipation of that decision.
That Neuroticism is associated with lower salience but not with decisiveness provides support
for the model-derived hypothesis that Neuroticism is associated with a decision to avoid paying
for costly information, but does not provide support for the hypothesis that Neuroticism is as-
sociated with the decision not to form a belief. This would appear to be a puzzle for our theory.
However, our model assumes an incorrect response carries a penalty, which may not hold for
the data used here, which was collected through an Internet survey. In the absence of a personal
interviewer, there may be no penalty for incorrect responses, which would result in no theoreti-
cal relationship between Neuroticism and decisiveness. In the course of everyday conversations
where individuals dispute political facts and provide social penalties for incorrect assertions, the
mechanismwe outline would hold, promoting indecisiveness and a lack of information-gathering
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amongNeurotics. Futurework incorporating clear punishments for incorrect assertions through
face-to-face survey administration, verification, and/or material punishments for incorrect re-
sponses is necessary to resolve this puzzle.
Additionally, our results speak to the larger body of work on uncertainty. While much of the
previous psychological work has focused on the role of personality and its role in opinion un-
certainty (e.g., Flehmig et al. 2007, Mondak et al. 2010, Robinson & Tamir 2005), other political
science work has focused more on opinion uncertainty as a function of education, political inter-
est, and other demographic variables (e.g., Alvarez & Franklin 1994, Bartels 1986, Delli Carpini
& Keeter 1996, Jackson 1993).24 One of the benefits of our model is that it estimates NA/DK
responses as functions of three latent factors (salience, opinion, and decisiveness), and these fac-
tors themselves are estimated as functions of personality traits and demographic variables (while
allowing for the inclusion of other variables), thus unifying much of the previous literature on
nonresponse.
Going forth, we plan on leveraging the framework of Ramey, Klingler &Hollibaugh (2015b)
to link personality traits to awide variety of political behavior via core cognitive constraints, with
the intent of framing underlying psychological processes in terms that may be incorporated into
formal models. Indeed, this paper has shown one way they may be formalized and tested, and
provides a blueprint for future scholars to incorporate personality traits into their own research.
24Other research investigates the role of value conflict (e.g., Alvarez & Brehm 2002).
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7 Online Appendix A: Model Diagnostics
Table A-1: Potential Scale Reduction Factors
Opinion Opinion Saliency Saliency
Intercept Slope Intercept Slope Decisiveness
(βα) (βγ ) (βη)
 
βψ
  
βδ

Neuroticism 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01
Conscientiousness 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.03
Agreeableness 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02
Extraversion 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01
Openness 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.03
Female 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01
Age 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01
Age2/100 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Black 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.02
Hispanic 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.02
Other Race 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.05
Education (1 =No HS; 6 = Postgrad) 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.03
High News Interest 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.03
Unknown News Interest 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.02
Income (1 = <10k; 12 = >150k; 13 = Refused) 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.03
Income Refused 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02
Employed Full-Time 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.04
Employed Part-Time 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.06
Retired 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01
Copartisan 1.05
Constant 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Obama NA
Cruz NA
Clinton 1.00
Paul 1.03
Bush 1.04
Democrats 1.01
Republicans 1.05
Tea Party 1.03
Supreme Court 1.02
c2 1.07
c3 1.09
c4 1.09
c5 1.08
c6 1.10
Note: Upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval reported. The Gelman-Rubin (1992) statistic (referred to as
the potential scale reduction factor [PSRF] or Rˆ) measures convergence within and across chains by estimating the
degree to which the scale of the current distribution for the parameter of interest might be reduced if the current
simulations were continued to infinity. This factor declines to 1 as the number of draws approaches infinity. Values
less than or equal to 1.10 suggest convergence.
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Figure A-1: Traceplots of Opinion Intercept Coefficient Draws.
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Figure A-2: Density Plot of Opinion Intercept Coefficient Draws.
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Figure A-3: Traceplots of Opinion Slope Coefficient Draws.
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Figure A-4: Density Plot of Opinion Slope Coefficient Draws.
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Figure A-5: Traceplots of Decisiveness Coefficient Draws.
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Figure A-6: Density Plot of Decisiveness Coefficient Draws.
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Figure A-7: Traceplots of Saliency Intercept Coefficient Draws.
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Figure A-8: Density Plot of Saliency Intercept Coefficient Draws.
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Figure A-9: Traceplot of Saliency Slope Coefficient Draws.
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Figure A-10: Density Plot of Saliency Slope Coefficient Draws.
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Figure A-11: Traceplots of Estimated Stimuli Placement Draws.
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Figure A-12: Density Plots of Estimated Stimuli Placement Draws.
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Figure A-13: Traceplots of Cutpoint Estimate Draws.
49
Cutpoint 2
Cutpoint 3
Cutpoint 4
Cutpoint 5
Cutpoint 6
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
0
2
4
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
1
2
3
4
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
2.2 2.4 2.6
3.2 3.4 3.6
4.8 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.6
Value
D
e
n
s
it
y
Chain
1
2
3
4
Figure A-14: Density Plots of Cutpoint Estimate Draws.
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